We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2] , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9] .
Introduction
In their studies of values of exchange economies with a continuum of players, Aumann and Shapley [2] introduced (non-atomic) market games, a class of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games that includes those arising from exchange economies. These games have been extensively studied in value theory (see, e.g., [24, Sect. 12] ) and our purpose in this paper is to provide a thorough study of their cores, a fundamental solution concept for TU games.
Hart [13] showed that under weak conditions the cores of market games arising from exchange economies are generically singleton and always …nite dimensional subsets of non-atomic measures. Our main result, Theorem 3, complements his result by showing that the cores of all market games are norm compact subsets of non-atomic measures. This shows that the cores of these games have a very strong structure and they are never "large", the …nite dimensional form being the most important one they can take. The results of Hart [13] can thus be viewed as "typical"for the cores of market games.
Theorem 3 actually holds for the larger class of games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, a class studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9] that contains large production games with a production function which satis…es decreasing returns to scale.
We then provide, in Theorem 7, a classi…cation of market games based on the properties of their na-extensions and on generalizations of the linear productions games of Owen [25] and Billera and Raanan [4] . Proposition 8 shows that the cores of these generalized linear production games admit a convenient representation, and in this way we extend earlier results of Billera and Raanan [4] , Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9] , and Marinacci and Montrucchio [17] . Finally, in Theorem 10 we provide a full characterization of exact market games.
Some of our results can be interpreted in the Multiple Priors model axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] . In particular, we will show how norm compact sets of priors consisting of non-atomic probability measures have some useful properties that do not hold for general sets of priors. For example, Multiple Priors preferences featuring such sets of priors are never Choquet Expected Utility preferences, unless they are Subjective Expected Utility. In other words, these Multiple Priors preferences have only a "trivial"overlap with Schmeidler [27] 's Choquet Expected Utility ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and preliminaries, Section 3 establishes the paper's main results, whose proofs are relegated to the Appendix, while Section 4 contains some examples. Finally, Section 5 provides the Multiple Priors interpretation of our results, and the reader only interested in this issue can move directly to this section, after having a look at Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 for some notation and terminology. 1 
Notation and Preliminaries

Transferable Utility Games
Let be the set of players, the -algebra of admissible coalitions. A (transferable utility) game is a real valued function : ! R such that (?) = 0. A game is: countably additive (a measure) if (
for all countable collections of pairwise disjoint sets fA i g The variation of a game : ! R is the function j j : ! [0; 1] de…ned by
where the supremum is taken over all …nite chains ? = A 0 A 1 ::: A n = A. A set function is of bounded variation if j j ( ) < 1. The map 7 ! j j ( ) de…nes the variation norm on the vector space bv ( ) all games of bounded variation (see [2, Sect. 4] ). The variation norm is complete.
Given a set function : ! X, a coalition N is -null, or simply null, if (A [ N ) = (A) for all A in . An atom of is a non-null coalition A such that for every B A, either B or A n B is null. If has no atoms, is called non-atomic (see, [2, p. 14] and [18, p. 55] ).
The set ba ( ) of all charges of bounded variation, its subset ca ( ) of all measures, and na ( ) of all non-atomic measures are closed subspaces of bv ( ). As well known, ba ( ) is (isometrically isomorphic to) the norm dual of the space B ( ) of all bounded and measurable functions (endowed with the supnorm), the duality being hg; i = R gd for all g in B ( ) and in ba ( ). We will sometimes write (g) instead of R gd . For all 2 R, the closed and convex subset of ba ( ) consisting of all measures taking value at the grand coalition is denoted by ba ( ); ca ( ) and na ( ) are de…ned analogously. 1 In the sequel subsets of are understood to be in even where not stated explicitly and they are referred to both as sets and as coalitions. 2 
Exact Games
The core of a game : ! R is the set core( ) = f 2 ba ( ) : ( ) = ( ) and (A) (A) for all A 2 g:
The core is a weak* compact subset of ba ( ). Games having non-empty cores are called balanced. A balanced game is exact if
An exact game is naturally extended to B ( ) by the function
Clearly, a game is exact if and only if it is the lower envelope
of a non-empty bounded subset K of ba ( ). 2 In this case, the weak* closed and
Notice that in general the inclusion is strict, namely, co (K) 6 = core ( K ) (see Examples 16, 17 , and 18 of Section 4). The next proposition is basically proved in [18, p. 54-58] .
Proposition 1 Let K be a non-empty bounded subset of ba ( ). The game K is continuous if and only if K is a relatively weak compact subset of ca ( ). In this case, K is non-atomic if and only if K na ( ).
Market and Pre-Market Games
An ideal coalition is an element of B ( ) taking values in [0; 1], and the set of all ideal coalitions is denoted by B 1 ( ). The set B 1 ( ) can be endowed with the na-topology due to Aumann and Shapley [2] , which is the coarsest topology that makes continuous all the functionals g 7 ! (g) with 2 na ( ). 3 By the Lyapunov Theorem, the characteristic functions are na-dense in B 1 ( ). Therefore, any game , when viewed as a function 1 A 7 ! (A) over the characteristic functions, has at most one na-continuous extension to B 1 ( ). Following Aumann and Shapley [2] , we denote this extension by . They show that (Prop. 44.27) if this extension exists then core ( ) na ( ).
We say that a game is a (non-atomic) market game if it is superadditive and admits a positively homogeneous na-continuous extension (see, e.g., Mertens [21] for a similar de…nition). This name is justi…ed by the fact that, under suitable conditions exchange economies with a continuum of agents can be modelled as market games (see Hart [13] ). For this reason, market games play an important role in value theory. 4 Aumann and Shapley [2, Prop. 27.1] show that the superadditivity of a market game is inherited by its extension , so that is superlinear when is a market game. In particular, this implies that a game is a market game if and only if it has a superlinear na-continuous extension .
We will also consider games having a concave na-continuous extension , and we will call them pre-market games. This class, introduced by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9] , contains all vector measure games of the form f , where is a …nite dimensional vector of non-atomic measures and f is a concave and continuous function de…ned on the range of . 5 Like market games, also vector measure games play an important role in value theory (see, e.g., Hart and Neyman [14] , and Neyman [23] ). Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9] show that a pre-market game is balanced if and only if is positively homogeneous along the diagonal f 1 : 2 [0; 1]g of B 1 ( ), and it is totally balanced if and only of it is a market game. 6 In the sequel we will make use of the following result, due to [19, Prop. 4] , which shows that convex and pre-market games have only a trivial overlap. 7 Lemma 2 A bounded convex game is a pre-market game if and only if it is a nonatomic measure.
Main Results
Cores
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 3
The core of a pre-market game is a norm compact set of non-atomic measures.
In other words, cores of pre-market and, a fortiori, of market games are norm compact subsets of na ( ). Notice that, as observed, while market games are neces-4 When ( ; ) is a standard Borel space, the class of games having na-continuous extensions coincides with Aumann and Shapley's class pN A 0 , while market games are the subclass they denote by H 0 (see [2, p. 273] and [12] ). 5 The case of in…nite dimensional is considered by Milchtaich [22] . 6 A game is totally balanced if for every A 2 the restriction of to \ A (i.e., the subgame determined by A) has non-empty core. 7 See the discussion of the proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix for a proof.
sarily balanced, pre-market games are not. Example 11 in Section 4 shows that the concavity of the na-continuous extension is crucial for this result. The following result is an important step in the proof of Theorem 3.
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Proposition 4 Let be a balanced pre-market game. For all t 2 (0; 1), core ( ) = @ (t1 ), e = D (t1 ; ), and e is continuous on the unit ball of B ( ) in the na-topology.
Besides Theorem 3, Proposition 4 has few other interesting consequences. Next we present two of them. The …rst is a known result on the games in pN A (see [2, Thm. J]), reported here for sake of completeness. 9 Corollary 5 If ( ; ) is a standard Borel space, then the core of any balanced premarket game in pN A is a singleton and it coincides with the Aumann-Shapley value.
The next sum rule is a second consequence of Proposition 4, and it shows that cores of pre-market games are stable under summation.
Corollary 6 If 1 and 2 are pre-market games, then
Note that (3) implies that core ( 1 + 2 ) = ? if core ( i ) = ? for some i. The sum rule (3) does not hold in general, and bounded convex games are the only other class of games for which it is known to hold (see [6] and [17, Cor. 9] ). However, by Lemma 2, bounded convex games and pre-market games are essentially disjoint classes of games, and so Corollary 6 provides a new important class of games for which the sum rule holds.
Linear Production Games
Using the extension properties of we can provide a classi…cation of market games. The simplest class of market games is given by the linear production games of Owen [25] and Billera and Raanan [4] . They are games of the form ' , where : ! R n is a non-atomic vector measure and ' : R n ! R is given by ' (x) = min t=1;:::;T a t x, with each a t 2 R n .
Marinacci and Montrucchio [17] and [19] have generalized this notion by considering games of the form 8 In the statement @ (t1 ) and D (t1 ; ) denote, respectively, the superdi¤erential and the directional derivative of at t1 in the sense of Convex Analysis, while e is the function de…ned by (1) . 9 pN A is the closure in the variation norm of the linear space of games that is generated by all powers of non-atomic probability measures.
where is a …nite dimensional compact subset of na ( ). These games are called generalized linear production games, and the linear production games are the special case corresponding to a …nite set . Motivated by Theorem 3, here we further generalize these notions by considering
for some norm compact na ( ). We call such a game an abstract linear production game.
We can now state the announced classi…cation of market games based on the extension properties of .
Theorem 7
The following properties are equivalent for a game :
(i) is an abstract (generalized, resp.) linear production game,
(ii) is a market game such that its na-extension admits a further superlinear extension to the unit ball of B ( ) (to the entire B ( ), resp.) that is na-lower semicontinuous at 0.
In other words, abstract linear production games are the market games whose na-extension can be extended from B 1 ( ) to the unit ball of B ( ), while generalized linear production games are the market games whose na-extension can be further extended to the entire space B ( ).
In view of Theorem 7, generalized and abstract linear production games are natural subclasses of market games. Interestingly, their cores admit a neat representation.
is an abstract linear production game, then
Proposition 8 extends to abstract linear production games the results of Billera and Raanan [4] and Marinacci and Montrucchio [17] on linear production games and generalized linear production games, respectively.
Along with Lemma 2, Theorem 7 implies that abstract linear production games are not convex, unless they are additive.
Corollary 9 An abstract linear production game is convex if and only if it is additive.
Corollary 9 shows, inter alia, that neither the core nor the set of the extreme points of the core of a non-additive and bounded convex game can be a compact (e.g., …nite) subset of na ( ). In fact, denote by either one of these two sets; if is a compact subset of na ( ), then ( ) = min 2 ( ) is an abstract linear production game, something impossible by Corollary 9.
We conclude this subsection by considering exact market games, a special class of abstract linear production games, and we fully characterize them and their cores. Observe that the lower probabilities considered in Section 5 are games of this type.
Theorem 10
The following conditions are equivalent for a game :
(i) is an exact market game;
(ii) is superadditive, and it admits an na-continuous extension to
for all ; 2 [0; 1] and all g 2 B 1 ( );
(iii) is exact and e is na-continuous on B 1 ( );
(iv) is exact, continuous, non-atomic, and its core is norm compact;
(v) is the lower envelope of some norm relatively compact subset K of na ( );
(vi) is a uniform limit of exact linear production games.
In this case, for any K such that (v) holds and for any sequence n of exact linear production games that uniformly converges to , we have:
where the limit is taken in the Hausdor¤ metric.
In particular, an exact game is a market game if and only if its core is a norm compact set of non-atomic measures. Marinacci and Montrucchio [19] showed that, in this case, the core is also the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of the game.
Examples
In this section we illustrate our results by means of some examples.
Example 11 Consider the bounded convex game
Then its core is a weak compact subset of non-atomic probability measures (see Lemma 24 in Appendix). Since is non-additive, its core cannot be norm compact (see also Example 15) . N Example 12 Not all market games are abstract linear production games. Consider for example the vector measure game = ' ( ; ), where ' (x; y) = p xy for all (x; y) 2 R 2 + and ; are two non atomic probability measures on a standard Borel space. The function ' is not Lipschitz and the game is a market game in pN A. Its extension cannot be extended as a superlinear function to the unit ball of B ( ). Thus is not an abstract linear production game. Notice that, however, this game can be represented as the minimum over a family of non-atomic measures. In fact,
The set a + b :
The measure game = ' ( ; ), with ; 2 na ( ), admits a natural extension to B ( ). Hence, is a linear production game. It is actually a glove market game in that it is easy to see that it has the representation = min f0; ; g. N
Example 14
We provide a simple example of an abstract linear production game. Let B be the Borel -algebra of the unit interval I, and let be the Lebesgue measure. Denote by n the uniform partition of I with cardinality n, and by B n the …nite -algebra generated by n . Fix an element f 2 L 1 ( ) and de…ne in L 1 ( ) the sequence:
By the classic Martingale Convergence Theorem (see, e.g., [7, p. 67 
The game (A) = min n2N n (A) is clearly an abstract linear production game. If, in addition, f is not B n -measurable for any n, this game is not a linear production game. By Theorem 10, is an exact market game and core ( ) = co f n : n 2 N g. A slight modi…cation of this example delivers a non-exact abstract linear production game. It su¢ ces to de…ne (A) = min n2N n n (A), where n is a scalar sequence approaching 1. N Example 15 Let (A) = min 2 (A), where the set na ( ) is weakly compact but not norm compact. By Proposition 1, is an exact, continuous and non-atomic game. However, in view of Theorem 10, is not a market game. Note that core ( ) and the inclusion may be strict. N By Theorem 10, any norm compact and convex subset K of na ( ) such that 1 ( ) = 2 ( ) for all 1 ; 2 2 K is the core of an exact market game. The next examples show that this is not true for compact and convex sets not contained in na ( ). More generally, these examples show that (7) may fail altogether if the non-atomicity assumption is removed.
Example 16 Let = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g and = 2 . Set K = f 2 ba ( ) : is a probability measure and (! 1 ) (! 2 )g :
The probability measure such that (! 1 ) = (! 3 ) = 1=2 belongs to core ( K ), but it does not belong to co (K)(= co (K) = co (K)). N Example 17 Let = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g and = 2 . Set K = f ; g, where and are probability measures such that (! 1 ) = (! 2 ) = 1=2 and (! 3 ) = 1, respectively. We have:
where
Since K is convex, this example, based on [16] and [28] , shows that (7) 
is a continuous and convex game. A probability measure belongs to core ( K ) if and only if (A) (A) for all A containing 0, and
where f d is the measure taking value R A f d on A. Clearly, core ( K ) is not …nite dimensional and it is therefore much larger than the …nite dimensional set co (K) (= co (K) = co (K)). N
Multiple Priors Interpretation
Some of our results can be interpreted in the Multiple Priors (MP) decision model axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] . Recall that in the MP model beliefs are represented by a set C of priors, and the non-singleton nature of this set re ‡ects the limited information on which decision makers base the quanti…cation of their beliefs. Formally, priors are probability charges and payo¤ prospects are elements of B ( ). Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] give necessary and su¢ cient conditions on a preference relation % on B ( ) that guarantee the existence of a weak* compact set C of priors such that f % g , min
The lower probability
can be viewed as the willingness to bet of the decision maker (see [10] ). The next result extends [5, Thm. 2], which gives necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the preference % that guarantee that C is a subset of na ( ). Here we show that a simple technical condition on % ensures that C is a norm compact (…nite dimensional, resp.) subset of na ( ).
Proposition 19
Let % be a MP preference with a weak* compact set of priors C. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C is a norm compact (…nite dimensional, resp.) subset of na ( );
The …rst important property of this kind of MP preferences is that they are uniquely determined by their willingness to bet:
Corollary 20 Let % 1 and % 2 be two MP preferences with norm compact sets of priors C 1 and C 2 contained in na( ). Then the following conditions are equivalent:
In particular, % 1 coincides with % 2 if and only if
Notice that point (i) amounts to say that % 1 is more ambiguity averse than % 2 in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [10] . Moreover, by Proposition 8 we have:
Corollary 21 If a norm compact set of priors C is contained in na ( ), then core ( C ) = co (C) :
As a result, it is easy to derive the core of the lower probability C when C is a norm compact set of priors consisting of non-atomic probability measures. In particular, core ( C ) = C if C itself is convex, so that convex and norm compact subsets of non-atomic probability measures are always the cores of the lower probabilities they generate.
All these considerations are false for general sets of priors, as Examples 16, 17, and 18 show.
By Corollary 6, lower probabilities generated by norm compact subsets of na ( ) form a convex set, and the map 7 ! core ( ) is a¢ ne.
Corollary 22
Corollary 9 takes the following form in the MP context.
Corollary 23
The lower probability C generated by a norm compact set C of priors contained in na ( ) is convex if and only if C is a singleton.
As observed after Corollary 9, this implies that if the core of a convex lower probability consists of non-atomic measures (that is, if the lower probability is continuous and non-atomic), then it cannot have …nitely many extreme points (unless the lower probability is a non-atomic probability measure itself).
Another important consequence of Corollaries 20 and 23 is that MP preferences featuring sets of priors that are norm compact subsets of na ( ) are never Choquet Expected Utility preferences (see Schmeidler [27] ), unless they are Subjective Expected Utility preferences. 10 
A Proofs and Related Material
A.1 Preliminaries
If is a positive measure, we denote by
i.e., I 1 ( ) = fg 2 L 1 ( ) : 0 6 g 6 1 a:e:g, and by ca ( ; ) the set of allabsolutely continuous measures, i.e., ca ( ; ) = f 2 ca ( ) :
g. Clearly, g 2 I 1 ( ) i¤ there is f 2 B 1 ( ) such that g (!) = f (!) for -almost every ! in .
The set ca ( ; ) is a closed subspace of ca( ) (of na ( ) if is non-atomic) and it is isometrically isomorphic to L 1 ( ). We will use repeatedly the fact that
has as neighborhood base at f 2 F the sets V f ("; 1 ; :::; n ) of the form:
V f ("; 1 ; :::; n ) = fg 2 F : jhg; i i hf; i ij < " 8i = 1; :::; ng where each i and " > 0. That is, the relative (L 1 ( ) ; L 1 ( ))-topology is the relative weak* topology of F . The functional e : B ( ) ! R given by (1) is de…ned for any balanced game (on the other hand, it is an extension of i¤ is exact).
Lemma 24
If a balanced game admits a na-continuous extension to B 1 ( ), then core ( ) na ( ) and (f ) e (f ) for all f 2 B 1 ( ).
Proof. By [2, Prop. 44.27], if 2 core ( ), then 2 na ( ) and is na-continuous.
passing to the na-limits we obtain (g) (g). Therefore, min 2core( ) (g) (g) for all g 2 B 1 ( ).
A.2 Norm Compactness and Support Functionals
Let X be a Banach space and X its norm dual. The bounded weak* topology is the …nest topology on X which on every ball coincides with the weak* topology. 11 If
K is a bounded non-empty subset of X, the support functional K : X ! R of K is de…ned by
hx; x i ; 8x 2 X :
Hormander [15, Thm. 6] shows that K is relatively (norm) compact and …nite dimensional i¤ K is continuous in the weak* topology, next lemma shows that the counterpart of relative norm compactness alone is bounded weak* continuity.
Lemma 25 A non-empty subset of a Banach space is norm relatively compact i¤ it is bounded and its support functional is continuous in the bounded weak* topology.
Proof. Let K be a non-empty bounded subset of the Banach space X, and B X = fx 2 X : kx k 1g be the unit ball in X . Since K is positively homogeneous, it is continuous in the bounded weak* topology i¤ its restriction to B X is continuous in the relative weak* topology. Let K be relatively norm compact. Given " > 0, choose x 1 ; :::; x n 2 K such that for all x 2 K, there exists i such that kx x i k ". For all x 2 B X , consider the relative weak* neighborhood of x given by U x (x 1 ; :::; x n ; ") = fy 2 B X : jhx j ; x y ij < " 8j = 1; :::; ng :
If y 2 U x , for all x 2 K, hx; x y i hx i ; x y i = hx x i ; x y i kx x i k kx y k 2", i.e.,
hx; x y i hx i ; x y i + 2" max j=1;:::;n hx j ; x y i + 2" 3":
Whence K (x y ) = sup x2K hx; x y i 3"; analogous considerations yield K (y x ) 3" (just switch x and y ). By the subadditivity of the support function, we can conclude that
for all y 2 U x , and so the restriction of K to B X is continuous in the relative weak* topology. Conversely, assume K is bounded and K is continuous in the bounded weak* topology. Then, the restriction of K to 2B X is continuous in the relative weak* topology. For all " > 0 there exists a relative weak* neighborhood of 0 (in 2B X ) U 0 (x 1 ; :::; x n ; ) = fz 2 2B X : jhx j ; z ij < 8j = 1; :::; ng such that K (z ) " for all z 2 U 0 . For all x 2 B X consider the relative weak* neighborhood U x (x 1 ; :::; x n ; ). For all y 2 U x we have x y ; y x 2 U 0 . Therefore, K (x y ) " and K (y x ) ", so that
When the elements of X are regarded as weak* continuous functions on the weak* compact set B X , what we proved amounts to the fact that: For all " > 0 and all x 2 B X , there exists a neighborhood U x of x such that sup x2K sup y 2U x jhx; x i hx; y ij ". That is, K is equicontinuous. Being bounded (sup x 2B X jhx; x ij = kxk sup y2K kyk for all x 2 K) and equicontinuous, K is relatively compact by the Ascoli-Arzelà Theorem in the space C (B X ) of all weak* continuous functions on B X endowed with the supnorm. Notice that
Since every sequence in K admits a Cauchy subsequence in C (B X ), it admits a Cauchy subsequence in X. We conclude that K is norm relatively compact in X (since X is complete).
For future reference we state the following immediate reformulation of Lemma 25.
Lemma 26 A non-empty subset K of a Banach space X is norm relatively compact i¤ it is bounded and the functional x 7 ! inf x2K hx; x i is continuous on B X in the relative weak* topology.
We close with a result on superdi¤erentials.
Lemma 27 Let X be a Banach space and ' :
for all 2 (0; 1).
Proof. Let 2 (0; 1) and x 2 @' ( x). By de…nition,
for all y 2 X. For all y = x with 2 (0; 1)nf g, we get (
. Hence, getting back to (9), we conclude that ' (y) x (y) 0 = ' ( x) x ( x). This implies both x 2 @' (0) and x 2 @' ( x). That is
Lemma 28 Let X be a Banach space, K a weak* compact subset of X , and
hx; x i ; 8x 2 X:
Proof. Clearly, ' (x) = min
hx; x i ; 8x 2 X;
and so @' (0) = co w (K ) as co w (K ) is convex and weak* compact. Moreover,
.10.18]).
Arbitrarily choose x 2 X. @' (x) is a weak* compact and convex subset of X . Next we show that @' (x) is extremal in @' (0). In fact, if x ; y 2 @' (0), t 2 (0; 1), and tx + (1 t) y 2 @' (x), then
hx; y i ' (x) , and t hx; x i + (1 t) hx; y i = hx; tx + (1 t) y i = ' (x) ; therefore hx; x i = hx; y i = ' (x) and x ; y 2 @' (x). Since @' (x) is extremal in @' (0), if u is an extreme point of @' (x), then u is an extreme point of @' (0) and it belongs to K . That is
By the Krein-Milman Theorem
A.3 A Separation Result
In the sequel we will need the following separation lemma, which is of some independent interest.
Lemma 29 Let K 1 and K 2 be non-empty, disjoint, norm compact, and convex subsets of na ( ). Then, there exists A in such that
Proof. Since K i is weakly compact and it consists of non-atomic measures, there exists a non-atomic probability measure i such that i i for all i in K i , i = 1; 2 (see [8, Thm IV.9.2] ). Therefore, all measures in K 1 [ K 2 are absolutely continuous w.r.t. = 2 1 ( 1 + 2 ). Therefore, K 1 and K 2 are norm compact subsets of
The Separating Hyperplane Theorem guarantees that there exist f 2 L 1 ( )nf0g
and 2 R such that min
Since K 1 ; K 2 na ( ), w.l.o.g. we can choose f 2 I 1 ( ). In other words, setting
0. By Lemma 25, z is continuous w.r.t. the relative weak* topology on I 1 ( ).
Hence, since the set f1 A g A2 is dense in I 1 ( ) by the Lyapunov Theorem, we conclude that (10) holds for some A 2 .
Corollary 30 Let K 1 and K 2 be non-empty subsets of na ( ). If K 2 is norm relatively compact, then
Proof. Assume, by contradiction that inf 1 2K 1 1 (A) inf 2 2K 2 2 (A) for all A 2 and there exists 2 K 1 co (K 2 ). Since co (K 2 ) = co K 2 and K 2 is norm compact, by the Mazur Compactness Theorem (see, [20, Thm 2.8.15]) co (K 2 ) is norm compact. Direct application Lemma 29 to co (K 2 ) and f g, yields that there exists B 2 such that
which is absurd.
A.4 Proofs of the Results
Theorem 3. If core ( ) = ? the result is trivial. Assume that core ( ) 6 = ?, and denote by the concave and na-continuous extension of to B 1 ( ). Lemma 24 guarantees that core ( ) na ( ), it remains to show that core ( ) is norm compact. (1 ). The claim immediately follows. Let t 2 (0; 1). If 2 core ( ), for all f 2 B 1 ( ) we have (f ) (f ) and (t1 ) = t (1 ) = t (1 ) = (t1 ),
that is 2 @ (t1 ). Conversely, if 2 @ (t1 ), satis…es (12) , setting f = 0 we obtain t ( ) t ( ), setting f = 1 we obtain (1 t) ( ) (1 t) ( ), whence ( ) = ( ) and (f ) (f ) ; 8f 2 B 1 ( ) ; a fortiori, 2 core ( ).
Given the concave function : B 1 ( ) ! R, let f 0 belong to the (supnorm) interior of B 1 ( ), and choose a positive scalar such that kf f 0 k implies f 2 B 1 ( ). Denote by D (f 0 ; h), with h 2 B ( ), the directional derivative, i.e.,
Since
In particular, if
Claim 3.
If is a weak* compact subset of ba ( ) and % : B ( ) ! R, de…ned by
is na-continuous on the unit ball B B( ) of B ( ), then is a norm compact subset of na ( ).
Clearly % is na-continuous on every ball tB B( ) with t > 0. Then, for all 2 , : B 1 ( ) ! R is continuous in the na-topology, and Lemma 24 implies 2 core ( ) na ( ). Then na ( ) is weak* compact in ba ( ), hence it is weak compact [18, p. 53], a fortiori, there exists a non-atomic probability measure 2 na ( ) such that ca ( ; ) (see [8, Thm. IV.9.2]). As a consequence, setting
Next we show that under the identi…cation of L 1 ( ) with the norm dual of ca ( ; ), the functional is continuous on B L 1 ( ) in the relative weak* topology (L 1 ( ) ; ca ( ; )), that is (being weak compact and -by Lemma 26 -norm relatively compact) is norm compact. 
:::; n :
Consider the weak* neighborhood of f
e.. Choose and E 2 be such that (E) = 0 and s i (E c ) = 0 for each i = 1; :::; n.
12 Set h = f 1 E + g1 E c . Then
.e. and (g 0 ) = (h) = % (h). Moreover, for all i = 1; :::; n
12 For i = 1; :::n there exists A i such that
This proves that is continuous on B L 1 ( ) in the relative weak* topology.
The proof is concluded by observing that:
Proposition 4 immediately descends from inspection of the above Claims 1 and 2. In particular, if a pre-market game is exact, the uniqueness of the na-continuous extension to B 1 ( ) implies that = ejB 1 ( ) and is positively homogeneous; therefore is a market game.
In turn this implies that a bounded convex (hence exact) pre-market game is a market game and [19, Prop. 4 ] is equivalent to Lemma 2. 
and the game 1 + 2 has empty core. Suppose now that core ( i ) 6 = ? for i = 1; 2. It follows that:
where we are using the sum rule for superdi¤erentials (see, e.g., [3, Ch. 3, Thm.
2.6]).
Theorem 7. (i) ) (ii). Assume there exists a norm compact (and …nite dimensional, resp.) subset of na ( ) such that (A) = min 2 (A) for all A 2 . There exists a non-atomic probability measure 2 na ( ) such that ca ( ; ) (see [8, Thm. IV.9.2] ). Lemma 26 guarantees that the functional
is continuous in the relative weak* topology of B L 1 ( ) , a fortiori, the extension of to B B( ) de…ned by (g) = min 2 (g) is superlinear and B B( ) ; ca ( ; ) -continuous, hence na-continuous. If, moreover, is …nite dimensional, [15, Thm. 6] guarantees that^ is continuous on (the entire) L 1 ( ) in the weak* topology.
(ii) ) (i). Assume that a market game admits an extension to B B( ) which is superlinear and na-lower semicontinuous at 0.
can be extended (by positive homogeneity) to a superlinear function on B ( ), which we still denote by . A standard argument guarantees that is na-continuous on every bounded subset of B ( ). A fortiori, is supnorm continuous on B ( ) and
where is a weak* compact and convex subset of ba ( ). Claim 3 of the proof of Theorem 3 shows that is a norm compact subset of na ( ). A similar argument, building on [15, Thm. 6] rather than Lemma 26, shows that if is na-lower semicontinuous at 0, as a function on B ( ) rather than on B B( ) , then is …nite dimensional. Consider the extension of to B ( ) de…ned by
Since is weak* compact in ba ( ), by Lemma 28,
Finally,
where the last equality holds since Mazur Compactness Theorem guarantees norm compactness of the set co f 2 : ( ) = ( )g.
Proof of Theorem 10. We …rst show that (i) ) (ii) ) (iii) ) (iv) ) (v) ) (i) and the …rst part of (7).
(i) ) (ii). Being a market game, admits a concave and na-continuous extension to B 1 ( ), exactness guarantees core ( ) 6 = ?. Proposition 4 yields that e is continuous on the unit ball B B( ) in the na-topology. A fortiori e is continuous on B 1 ( ), and exactness guarantees that ejB 1 ( ) is an extension of to B 1 ( ). It follows that ejB 1 ( ) = and (6) holds. (ii) ) (iii). As is superadditive, by [2, Prop. 27.1] is superadditive. While setting = 0 in (6) guarantees positive homogeneity. A routine exercise shows that admits an extension to the entire space B ( ) which is superlinear and such that (g + 1 ) = (g) + ( ) for all g 2 B ( ) and all 2 R. Next we show that is supnorm continuous. In fact, if g n ! g in the supnorm, there exist 2 (0; 1) and 2 R such that g n + 1 ; g + 1 2 B 1 ( ) and g n + 1 ! g + 1 in the supnorm. Therefore ( g n + ) ! ( g + ) for all 2 na ( ). Since is na-continuous on B 1 ( ), then ( g n + ) ! ( g + ) and
Therefore, (g) = min
where @ (0) = f 2 ba ( ) : (g) (g) for all g 2 B ( )g. For all 2 @ (0) and all A 2 we have (A) (A); moreover, ( ) = ( 1 ) ( 1 ) = ( ), whence ( ) = ( ) and 2 core ( ). Therefore, @ (0) core ( ) and for all g 2 B 1 ( ) (g) = min
The last inequality follows from Lemma 24. This proves that e = is nacontinuous on B 1 ( ) and that is exact.
(iii) implies (iv). Exactness guarantees that ejB 1 ( ) is a concave extension of to B 1 ( ). Then na-continuity of ejB 1 ( ) = , together with Theorem 3, guarantees that core ( ) is a norm compact subset of na ( ). Continuity and non-atomicity of follow from Proposition 1.
(iv) ) (v). Continuity and non-atomicity of , together with Proposition 1, guarantee core ( ) na ( ) ( ). Just set K = core ( ).
(v) ) (i) and the …rst part of (7). Assume is the lower envelope of a norm relatively compact subset K of na ( ). Obviously is exact and co (K) co (K) core ( ). Proposition 1 guarantees that is continuous and non-atomic, a second application of Proposition 1, yields that core ( ) na ( ). Since
Corollary 30 implies core ( ) co (K). Therefore co (K) = co (K) = core ( ) na ( ) and the Mazur Compactness Theorem implies that of core ( ) is norm compact. Exactness of and Theorem 7 imply that is a market game.
In sum, (i)-(v) are equivalent and the …rst part of (7) holds.
Next we show the equivalence between (i) and (vi) and that the second part of (7) holds.
(i) ) (vi). Since core ( ) is a norm compact subset of na ( ), for all " > 0, there is a …nite subset M of core ( ) such that for all 2 core ( ) there exists 2 M with k k < ". Consider the exact linear production game M . Clearly, M . Let A be any coalition and 2 core ( ) such that (A) = (A). If 2 M satis…es k k < ", we have
So that sup A2 j M (A) (A)j ", which implies that belongs to the supnorm closure of the set of exact linear production games.
(vi) ) (i) and the second part of (7). Let n be a sequence of exact linear production games uniformly converging to . Notice that n is a na-continuous and bounded function on B 1 ( ) for all n 2 N. Next we show that n is a Cauchy sequence (in the space C b (B 1 ( )) of all bounded and na-continuous functions on B 1 ( ) endowed with the supnorm). For all " > 0 there exists p 2 N such that for all m; n p sup A2 j m (A) n (A)j "; but, the function j m n j : B 1 ( ) ! R is na-continuous and the characteristic functions are na-dense in B 1 ( ), therefore
Let be the limit of n in C b (B 1 ( )) with the supnorm. Checking that is superadditive, is an extension of to B 1 ( ) (obviously na-continuous), and that satis…es condition (6) of (ii) is an easy exercise. Hence is an exact market game. Now, notice that, by (iii) we have that = ejB 1 ( ) and n = ( n ) ejB 1 ( ) . The uniform convergence of n to amounts to say that
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Let 0 2 na ( ) be a probability measure such that core ( ) ca ( ; 0 ) and n 2 na ( ) be a probability measure such that core ( n ) ca ( ; n ) for all n 1. The non-atomic probability measure
is such that core ( ) ; core ( n ) ca ( ; ) for all n 1. Therefore, (18) This concludes the proof since the Hausdor¤ distance between core ( n ) and core ( ) in ca ( ; ) (and hence in ba ( )) is given by (see, e.g., [1, Ch. 6.7] ):
Proposition 19. Set V C (f ) = min p2C p (f ) for all f 2 B ( ).
(i) ) (ii). If C is a norm compact (resp. …nite dimensional) subset of na ( ), then (see the proof of Theorem 7) V C is na-continuous on B B( ) (resp. B ( )), and (ii) follows.
(ii) ) (i). For all r 2 R, fV C rg\B B( ) (resp. fV C rg) and fV C rg\B B( ) (resp. fV C rg) are na-closed. Therefore, V C is a superlinear and na-continuous extension of C to B B( ) (resp. B ( )). The technique used at the end of the proof of Theorem 7 delivers (i).
Corollary 20. Set V C i (f ) = min p2C i p (f ) for all f 2 B ( ), i = 1; 2.
(i) ) (ii). For all f 2 B ( ), f i V C i (f ) 1 for i = 1; 2, hence V C 2 (f ) 1 2 f % 2 V C 1 (f ) 1 and V C 2 (f ) V C 1 (f ), in particular C 1 C 2 . (ii) ) (i). By Corollary 30, C 2 co (C 1 ). Therefore, V C 2 V co(C 1 ) = V C 1 , and (i) immediately follows.
Corollaries 21, 22, and 23 are just restatements of Proposition 8, Corollary 6, and 9.
